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Prof. Sharon Bailin makes a number of very interesting and salient points in
her discussion of my argumentation programme, coalescent argumentation
[CA]. There is a great deal that she says that is worthy of comment and even
more that beckons one into deep discussion, coalescent, critical or otherwise.
Unfortunately, time constraints do not permit the full exploration her comments
demand, so I will limit myself to addressing the more general points.
Bailin relies a lot on the idea of fallibilism as an epistemological foundation for
inquiry, and points out that CA does not fit well with this admittedly very popular
and attractive view. It is attractive, if for no other reason, than its avoidance of
the deeper metaphysical pitfalls of theories of truth. That is, it is generally
easier, a la modus tollens, to identify a falsehood than a truth. So one does not
have to say, P is true, but rather, Q is false, and P is not shown to be false.
The difficulty for a CA approach, however, is that fallibilism carries with it not
only the idea that one ought to reject arguments that cannot be well defended,
but also the criteria for successful defense and a complete ideology of what is
and is not acceptable evidence. The general principle that one ought to try to
falsify what one believes is not objectionable in many circumstances, (though
more often than not the falsification is directed at the other person’s position
and not one’s own.) There is nothing to prevent astrologers from using a
fallibilist framework when arguing amongst themselves, though this idea
horrifies many C-L subscribers. Similarly, if every reason A has for believing in
God is undermined by attacks on them, and A ultimately relies on an inner sight
or vision, then, on fallibilist terms, A is wrong – unless inner vision or religious
insight is permitted as an acceptable form of argumentation. On most fallibilist
accounts, it is not; fallibilism is an avowedly rationalist and empiricist
programme, and inner sight or hunches are only permitted when reducible to
more concrete terms.
In short, there is nothing wrong with fallibilist processes so long as the
framework in which they are taking place is flexible. Simply put, modus tollens
works because it is convincing, it makes sense to us. But it works within
whatever framework it occurs, whether that be two scientists or two
theologians. So I agree that the fallibilist conception is a useful one, but doubt
that it will serve to limit coalescence when it is not tied to a particular
framework of evidence and procedure.
Another key issue is just how often pure inquiry raises or attempts to raise its
head. I agree with Bailin when she allows that there are few if any pure critical
inquiries, and even allow that there may be more mixed inquiry/persuasion
dialogues than I sometimes seem to indicate. The difficulty is that the aspects
that we acknowledge as impurities are frequently among the most crucial to
understanding the underlying dynamics of the disagreement. Moreover, very
few critics rush to acknowledge that there are very many arguments where the
logical plays only a minor role.
On an airplane recently I overheard the following.
Example (1)
SHE: We never seem to really talk anymore.
HE: Sure we do, we talk all the time.
SHE: But I don’t feel like we really communicate.
HE: That’s because you’re always talking about your work.
SHE: Not all the time.
HE: Well, a lot of the time – most of it, in fact.
SHE: Oh, never mind.
HE: See, when the talk becomes real you stop it.
In this example, the logical is used to stifle and diminish the emotive content of
the initial assertion. The question is moved, a la the C-L model, to an
empirical, falsifiable issue: Do we or do we not talk much these days. As a
result the point, and an opportunity for coalescence is missed.
There are certainly argument situations where the C-L model is worthwhile and
inquiry does have a good grip. In a recent hiring decision in my department,
discussions were open and well considered, and various people changed their
minds and opinions based on contributions of others. But by the same token I
was struck by how much that was said stemmed not from logical bases, but
from kisceral (i.e., intuitive) sources based on a great deal of experience. In
addition, while one could sense a number of agendas that were not completely
on the table, by and large it was an open and careful process. Yet a great deal
was not what is typically classed as "rational."
Fallibilism and the C-L models work within a framework of rules for evidence
and procedure that are only rarely examined. The dyed in the wool, thoroughly
socialized, highly committed and completely trained rationalist knows what is
right and what is wrong, knows good evidence from bad, knows that science
finds the truth and mysticism does not. These are the people who can oppose
the creation of a school of chiropractic at York University while not batting an
eye at the existence of the Economics Department. The discussions are
heated, and personal identities and values are deeply involved. I don’t want to
throw out the concrete arguments, I just want to say two things. First, we have to
agree on our framework, and secondly, we need to uncover everything that’s
going on.
As a proponent of CA and the underlying conception that the general goal of
argument is agreement, I am frequently confronted with situations intended to
make me balk. These sorts of cases commonly include one mentioned by
Bailin. This is the notorious white supremacist convincing "an initially skeptical"
someone of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy based on arguments the
supremacist brings forth. The arguments, as described, include "the fact that
there are many Jewish businesses and politicians and that such a conspiracy
is described in a neo-nazi tract." I.e., there are two arguments, the first being
an allegedly empirical fact concerning the numbers of businesses owned by
Jews, and the second an appeal to the authority of a Nazi manuscript. As a
result of these two arguments, the listener is convinced. Since, clearly, I am not
a white supremacist but, as a matter of fact, a Jew, my theory must find a way
to declare this argumentation wrong or fallacious.
How do I deal with this? How do I say they are not good arguments? Tha
answer is that I don’t. Rather, I deny the example. If the listener is actually
initially skeptical (as per Bailin’s hypothesis) and convinced by such weak
arguments, then he is either an idiot or someone who has other goals, attitudes
and emotions to which the position appeals. In other words, if those two
arguments were what actually convinced the listener, then there was more
going on in the interaction than meets the ear. Persuasion simply does not
happen as Bailin describes it in this story. It is a much more complex, involved
and time consuming human endeavour.
Most often, when we argue, we work within shared frameworks; we
communicate with people we know, or, at least, with people who share a
certain set of values regarding the matter under discussion. I may, at a
baseball game get into an argument with someone sitting near me about the
wisdom of the local team’s pitching rotation, and that person may well be a
white supremacist, and I may never know it. As long as our conversation sticks
to baseball, the framework within which we are working is shared. As
Brockriede pointed out, we must share sufficient beliefs and values in order to
argue to any point at all. It is for that reason also that arguments about very high
level principles are so frequently fruitless. There are simply insufficient
subordinate shared beliefs for disputants to make any headway whatsoever. It
is much better for Netanyahu and Arafat to set aside the question of who is
right and who is wrong and concentrate instead on how to stop the killing and
strife.
Another, related, question Bailin raises concerns argument evaluation. And
again, the C-L model provides allegedly a clear method for evaluating
arguments, while CA merely seeks consensus.(Actually, I do not think I much
use the word ‘consensus,’ or if I do, then not very often, because coalescence
is different from consensus.) So, people could agree to very bad arguments,
and such a possibility is anathema to C-L because people must only be
convinced by good arguments.
First of all, we have an enormous problem in determining what is a good
argument. Relevance, sufficiency and acceptability, the icons of the C-L
methodology, are all practically relative terms dependent upon the background
of the interlocutor and the importance of the issue. If the radio announces that
Friendly Fish tuna is contaminated with botulism, I accept that fact and toss my
two cans out. On the other hand, my grocer, who has stacks of the stuff and a
multitude of customers who have carried tins away, needs to call the distributor
and find out if this is true or rumour. Both of us are using good judgement in
evaluating according to R-S-A criteria, but by different standards because of
different goals and needs. R-S-A criteria are relative to values, goals and
motives.
Secondly, a great deal of argument evaluation takes place within the process
of arguing itself. Arguments are usually only evaluated when there is
disagreement, and that normally involves an inherently critical attitude. If we
agree, and you give me an argument that does not really impress me, I may
say nothing at all. But, if we disagree, then I will have a lot to say. Again, we
don’t change our minds all that lightly, and our natural inertia is, perhaps, our
first line of defense.
Thirdly, I agree completely there certainly is a need for a rigorous normative
review of the alternative modes. I have allowed that this is the case, have
begun the first steps, and invite any and all to take up a piece of the project.
There is more than enough to go around, it just cannot be done in a day.
The ideal of the Critical-Logical approach is the notion of inquiry. In a pure
inquiry there is no room for attachment, no concern for who is right and who is
wrong, emotions are absent or, at the very least, in check and irrelevant as
persuasive objects. Face goals and ego considerations are non-existent
because the sole concern is what is the truth, or, less metaphysically
contentious (and because I do not want to hyperbolize,) what is the best
answer we can arrive at at this time. The arguments-1 put forward are viewed
and analyzed in their own right and on their own merits, without regard to who
put them forward, why they were put forward, or what non-logical associations
they might have. In this way we can investigate the mind/body problem, come
to a conclusion about capital punishment, or determine if placing an outlet of
our bookstore chain across from the Brock campus would be profitable.
Of course, no one, including Bailin, believes that a totally pure ideal critical
inquiry actually exists, or, if it does, it’s as rare as hen’s teeth. Rather, one can
seek to approach the ideal with an eye to conducting the purest inquiry
possible, even to the extent of having checks on each other when it seems that
non-logical modes are creeping in. If we are business partners, and our only
concern is for what is best for our business, then we will, indeed, do our best to
try and separate our logical and non-logical considerations. But the difficulty is
that purely logical inquiries are very rare, and more often than not the non-
logical component is significant and, therefore, needs to be dealt with and
considered in meaningful and respectful ways. This is not only because we
want to understand the dynamics of an argumentation more fully, but also
because the hegemony that has ruled the court of argumentation has not really
proved itself successful. If we consider that argument is the main alternative to
violence, and examine how many disputes and issues are settled non-violently,
then, ladies and gentlemen, we’re not doing all that well.
One can answer, of course, that the reason is the lack of C-L skills, rather than
the non-admissibility of non-logical argumentation modalities. But if the reality
is that most times the full range of modalities enter into a dispute, then it
behooves us to accept that and acknowledge it. The C-L model has long been
used as much to silence people as it has to permit the careful resolution of
arguments. Whether it was the voices of women when they were for so long
excluded from the education required to become adept in C-L, native peoples
whose methods of justice and adjudication appear non-logical, immigrants
whose manner of communication relies heavily on the expression of emotion,
or cultures where argumentation crucially involves story-telling and indirection,
C-L centred arguments have been used to silence, not inquire.
I well know that the essential techniques of C-L can be useful and valuable, and
I deeply appreciate Prof. Bailin’s acknowledging that recognition. But if
Argumentation Theory is to become an effective arena of study for the
resolution of human conflict, then we need to hack our way into the jungle of
real argumentation and examine all the species there, not just the ones we find
back home.
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